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TEACHING REAL ToRTs: 
UsiNG BARRY WERTH's DAMAGES 
IN THE LAw ScHOOL CLASSROOM 
Tom Baker* 
My favorite insurance case does not have insurance in the caption, cannot 
be found in any reporter, has no written opinions. and was settled before trial. 
To the uninitiated, it's not an ''insurance'' case at all. Yet, thankfully, the case 
-Sabia 1'. Nonmlk Hospital-sufficiently intrigued Barry Werth that he made 
it the subject of Damages, 1 one of the best books about torts and insurance 
since Larry Ross's Settled Out of Court .2 Sabia is my favorite insurance case 
because it shows how completely tort law in action is tied up with insurance. 
Sabio 1'. Norwalk Hospital is a medical malpractice case brought on behalf 
of Tony Sabia, who almost died shortly before he was born. Tony"s twin 
brother Michael did die, and whatever caused Michael 's death starved Tony's 
brain of oxygen long enough to cause profound damage. The defendants in the 
case are Mary Ellen Humes, the doctor who delivered Tony and MichaeL and 
Norwalk Hospital, the hospital where Tony was born and that ran the maternity 
clinic that treated Tony's mother. 
The outlines of the case are easily summarized. No one disputed that 
Tony suffered a terrible harm. What was in dispute. however, was almost 
every other aspect of a negligence case: standard of care, breach. causation, 
and damages. What was the standard of care that Dr. Humes was to have fol­
lowed at the time of delivery and did she breach it? What was the standard of 
care the maternity clinic was to have followed in the months leading up to the 
birth, and did the clinic breach it? Even if there was negligence. did that negli­
gence cause Tony's harm? And, what is the proper measure of that harm? 
Once the case was fully developed, the claim against Dr. Humes turned on 
the legal significance of the fact that, because she did no fetal monitoring, she 
did not know that Tony"s twin was dead until he was born. Once the case was 
fully developed, the claim against the hospital turned on the conduct of the 
nurses in the delivery room and, more importantly, on the fact that the mater­
nity clinic had not done two pre-natal tests. Once the case was fully developed, 
the causation dispute turned on whether any of this made any difference to 
Connecticut Mutual Professor. Universi ty of Connecticut School of Law. Thank you to 
Michael Koskoff. Chris Bernard, April Haske l l ,  Mary Ellen Humes, B i ll Doyle and BaiTY 
Werth for taking my students (and me) behind the scenes of the Subiu l i t igation .  Thank you 
to Marianne Sadowski  for research assistance. and to Les l i e  Levin.  Hugh Macgi ll, Francis 
Mootz, Jeremy Paul ,  and Jim Stark for helpful comment on an earlier draft of this article .  
I BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES ( 1998). 
2 H. L"-L'RENCE Ross. SETTLED OL'T OF CouRT: THE Soc i AL PROCEss oF lNSL'RANCE 
CL."'Irvis ADJUSTMENTS (Aldine Pub. 1970). 
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Tony's condition, and the damages dispute turned on how long Tony would 
live. 
With all of these I emphasize the phrase, "once the case was fully devel­
oped." Damages wonderfully demonstrates that cases do not spring into life 
fully formed and easily summarized in a few paragraphs in an appellate opinion 
(or Jaw professor's essay). Cases are born out of chaos, and it is trial lawyers 
who give them their shape. How they do that is determined, in important part. 
by insurance institutions. 
I came to Damages in a roundabout way that the autobiographical nature 
of this Symposium allows me the luxury of reporting. In this essay I will 
(briefly) tell that story and then describe how I use the book in my torts class. 
before concluding with some observations on the jurisprudence of Damages . 
As I wi II argue, the benefits that Damages can bring to the law school class­
room go well beyond my parochial interest in initiating torts students into the 
significance of insurance. 
I. THE ROAD TO DAMAGES 
In my research, I use qualitative methods to explore tort law in action. 
This research grew out of my frustration with a highly stylized approach to tort 
law I first associated with law and economics scholarship but now associate 
equally with much of the scholarship in the corrective justice tradition. I sus­
pected that tort law was more complicated on the ground and started interview­
ing personal injury lawyers to find out. This research led to a series of articles 
that taught me a great deal about the relationship between torts and insurance 
and that I hope have been helpful to others as well.3 
Perhaps the main advantage of having looked at torts through practicing 
lawyers' eyes is a clearer view of tort law in action as a pragmatic search for 
money through an institutional landscape. That is certainly not all that tort law 
is, but it is an aspect that the leading theoretical approaches - law and econom­
ics. corrective justice, traditional doctrinal analysis, and critical legal studies -
usually ignore."' The institutions this perspective highlights are liability insur­
ance, other types of insurance (e.g., Medicare and workers compensation). and 
3 See Tom Baker, Blood Monev, New Money and The Moral Economr of Ton Lmr in Action. 
35 L\ w & Soc. REv. 275 (200 I); Tom Baker, Tmn.1jimning Punishment Into Cmnpen.la­
rion: In the Shadmt· of Punitive Damages, 1998 W1s. L. REv. 21 L Tom Baker, Reconsider­
ing Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 W1s. L. REv. I 0 I; Tom Baker. Liahi/it\' 
Insuronce Conflicts and Defense LaH'rers: From Triangles ro Tetmhedrons. 4 CoNN. INs. 
L.J. 101 ( 1997/1998). Cf ToM BAKER, Insurance and the Lt.!n·. in II INTERN.-\TJONAL ENcY­
CLOPEDLA. OF SoCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, 7587 (200 I) (summarizing the ways that 
insurance "regulates" tort law). 
4 The l aw and economics l i terature especial ly ,  and the corrective justice li terature to a lesser 
extent as well, do address insurance. Indeed, the l aw and economics li terature on insurance 
is extensive. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogv of Moral Ha:ard. 75 TEx. L. REv. ?.37 
( 1996) ( reviewing l aw and economics l iterature on insurance) .  But the insurance that 
appears in thi s l i terature is theoretical - a featureless and frict ionless risk spread ing (and 
sometimes loss preventing) mechanism that operates directly on atomistic i nd ividuals ( or 
organizations treated as atomistic i ndividuals) without mediating institutions. This  approach 
to insurance may be fine, even necessary, for economic analysis, but it is a very thi n  view for 
people seeking to understand the role of law i n  society. 
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the norms and practices of the personal injury bar. Above alL these institutions 
focus on money. Not because they are cold and heartless (though they may be). 
but because money - damages - is the main remedy tort Jaw offers injured 
plaintiffs and, as a result, the fulcrum around which these institutions turn.5 
Eventually, this research led to the obvious suggestion that I switch from 
teaching contracts to torts. In  preparing to teach torts, I decided that if my 
research highlighted the importance of damages, my class would also. But 
when I realized that the leading torts casebooks put that topic well towards the 
back, my resolve faded. I wasn't about to go out of order the first time I taught 
the class, so I took the torts book most of my other colleagues were using and 
went more or less straight through until I ran out of time at the end of the 
semester. The experience was a good one and what I had learned from my 
research was helpful to me in teaching the class. Nevertheless. I was unhappy 
about not getting to damages, and resolved to start there next time, no matter 
what. 
For much of the following summer, I avoided my torts problem. I wanted 
to teach the course in a very different order than the casebook, which I other­
wise liked; but I knew from experience that students are unhappy about bounc­
ing around in a book. To make matters worse, the topic I wanted to start with­
damages - was buried deep inside the book. 
Just when this procrastination was threatening to ruin the end of the sum­
mer, a new. paperback - Damages - appeared in my box. Now that was a title 
that really spoke to me! One chapter led to another and, before long. I had 
decided this book might be the answer to my problem. To be sure, I asked my 
research assistant to take a look. When he told me that he read it straight 
through, wedged for twenty hours in the back seat of a car, I knew I had 
something. 
Barry Werth's Damages turned out to be everything a torts teacher would 
want A Civil Action6 to be. A Civil Action is a great story because it gives a 
compelling account of a unique lawyer's odyssey through the legal system. 
But in telling the lawyer's story, A Civil Action shorts almost everyone else's. 
In contrast, Damages offers a synoptic view of an ordinary medical malpractice 
case - special only because of the size of the damages and unique only because 
of the attention Barry Werth gives it. The very things that made Damages less 
commercially successful than A Civil Action make it more successful in the law 
school classroom. Detailed descriptions of substantive and procedural aspects 
of the case that might overwhelm a general reader provide helpful context for a 
law student struggling to understand how the law works in practice. While 
perhaps not as great a read as A Civil Action, Damages certainly shines in 
5 No one needs persuading that insurance institutions are focused on money. Nor would 
most lay people need persuading that the personal injury bar is also focused on money. For 
research on the personal injury bar, see Herbert M .  Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns 
of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAuL L. REv. 267 (1998): Herbert M .  Kritur, 
Contingent Fee- Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement Expectation.>, Selllement Realities, 
and Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY. 795 
( 1998); HAZEL GENN, HARD BARGAINING: OuT oF CouRT SETTLEMENT IN PERSONAL 
INJURY AcTIONS (1987); as well as my Transforming and Blood MoneY articles, supra note 
3. 
6 JoNATHAN HAAR, A CrviL AcTION (Vintage Books 1 996). 
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comparison to the casebooks, hornbooks. legal outlines, and other things law 
students are reading. 7 
II .  DAMAGES AS A ToRTS TEACHING TooL: 
BRINGING INSURANCE INTO TORTS 
One of the things that makes Damages an effective teaching tool is that 
Barry Werth doesn't  tell the reader that Tony' s  case is an insurance case. He 
shows it, and he does even that with an understatement that can lull a reader 
into thinking that insurance pops up from time to time only as a sideline, tan­
gential to the main action. A torts student, especially, can be forgiven for 
thinking that way, because that 's  often the way tort law is taught.8 
Tort lawyers almost never think that way, and the lawyers in Danwges are 
no exception. Collecting liability insurance money is the raison d · erre of 
Tony' s lawyers.9 Liability insurance companies hire and fire the defense law­
yers, direct the defense, and decide whether and when to settle. Even first­
party insurance shapes Tony's case. Domages shows that it's not for nothing 
that the name of the second largest section of the American Bar Association is 
the Tort and Insurance Practice Section. 
Yet, the importance of insurance is easy for torts students to miss, even in 
Damages. From a pedagogical perspective, the hidden nature of insurance -
hiding in plain view - is a plus, because it allows for a bit of useful magic in 
the torts classroom. Before revealing the magic trick, however, I'll first 
describe how I use Damages to teach tort doctrine. 
A. Using Damages to Teach Tort Doctrine 
I begin teaching tort doctrine by introducing the "five fingers" of the neg­
ligence cause of action - duty, breach of the standard of care, causation. 
defenses, and damages - and I organize my (one semester) course around these 
doctrinal elements, plus strict liability. I start with damages, and then move on 
to breach, followed by defenses, causation, and duty, before concluding with 
7 A VERY IMPORTANT NOTE FOR TEACHERS CONSIDERING USING THE BOOK: What Damages 
offers that a casebook cannot is factual depth. For this reason. Damages only works i f  
students develop a detailed and comprehensive understanding o f  the facts. That requires 
encouragement. I send a letter out to the students before the semester begins. telling them 
about Damages and asking them to read it before they anive on campus. I try to bui ld 
enthusiasm about the book by talking informally to students about i t  during the orientation 
events. Typically. I find that they ' ve already been talking about it among themselves. Dur­
ing the first day of class, I announce that, throughout the semester, I wi ll  expect everyone to 
have a detailed and comprehensive understanding of the facts of the Sahia case as they relate 
to the particular doctrinal issue we are studying, and that we wil l  start with the doctrinal 
e lement '"damages'' the first day of the second week of class. That is usually enough to get 
them to prepare for the damages discussion . Asking detailed questions about the Sahia case 
during that and succeeding discussions, and using the case as a point of reference as often as 
possible, keeps them on track. 
8 For evidence that torts is not always taught that way, see David  A .  Fischer & Robert H. 
Jeny, II, Teaching Torts Without Insurance: A Second-Best So/wion, 45 ST. Lou1s U. L.J. 
857 (200 I ). which was very helpful to me in preparing this essay. 
9 Tony Sabia was ably represented in the case by the law firm of Koskoff, Koskoff and 
B ieder of B ridgeport, Connecticut. 
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strict liability and an all too brief look at alternative compensation systems. 10 
Damages helps present almost all of these topics. 
1. Damages 
It may seem a small thing, but Damages starts helping me by legitimating 
the choice to begin the course by studying tort damages even though 
casebooks, hornbooks and study aids put that topic toward the back. Damages 
is the title of the book - one of the first books the students are required to read 
for law school. The potential size of Tony's damages explains the enormous 
effort devoted on all sides to the case. Moreover, the dispute over the size of 
the damages dominates the settlement dance featured in the last third of the 
story . Damages signals strongly that emphasizing damages is a sensible thing 
to do in a torts class. 
I prefer to begin with damages for some of the same reasons that Werth 
chose that title for his book. Damages bring torts down to earth - everyone 
thinks they understand money - while at the same time raising profound ques­
tions. What are the purposes of tort law and how should those affect tort reme­
dies? Why is money the dominant remedy? How can we possibly decide the 
right amount of money for a given harm? Should tort law calibrate the dam­
ages according to the moral wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct? Can tort 
law, in practice. avoid that calibration? Why do we compensate in a Jump sum 
fashion') What are the practical consequences of that and other aspects of dam­
ages doctrine? How does the money-dominated reality of tort law in action 
affect which cases are brought and how they are handled? To what degree 
should we acknowledge the shaping power of money in the development of tort 
doctrine? 
Damages helps frame the discussion of these and other open-ended, 
potentially vague and difficult to contain questions, so that students can explore 
in a realistic and concrete situation some of the moral and practical complexi­
ties of tort law. The factual depth of the book allows students to consider each 
of these questions from many different yet factually grounded perspectives. 
The following is just one example. 
The casebook I use, by Franklin and Rabin, 1 1 contains a wonderful case 
that addresses the question of judicial control over damages for pain and suffer­
ing: Seifert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines.12 In that case, a bus company (Los 
Angeles Transit Lines) asked the California Supreme Court to reverse a trial 
verdict in which the pain and suffering damages were several multiples of the 
medical expenses and lost wages. u In affirming the verdict, the Seifert major­
ity takes a classic individual justice perspective in which the purpose of tort law 
10 I cover defenses immediately after breach of the standard of care for two reasons. So 
many of the leading "breach'' cases involve contributory negligence, and I am persuaded that 
most of the "defenses'' cases are better understood in contemporary tort doctrine as either 
"no breach" or "comparative faul t'' cases. I cover duty after causation because my students 
understand Pa/sgraf better that way and also because I have always found duty the most 
difficult aspect of tort law. 
11 MARK A. FRANKLIN & RoBERT L. RABIN, ToRT LAw AND ALTERNATIVES ( David L. 
Shapiro et al. eds. ,  Foundation Press, 5th ed. 1992). 
12 364 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1961). 
l.1 !d. at 340-41. 
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is righting individual wrongs, and the proper measure of damages turns on the 
subjective experience of the person who was wronged. In this view, tort law is 
about the obligations a particular defendant owes a particular plaintiff. and the 
goal of tort damages is to restore the moral balance between these two. 
Because the trier of fact is in a much better position to evaluate unique, individ­
ual situations, appellate judges should not second guess damages decisions. 
Justice Traynor, in dissent, presents an alternative, actuarial perspective in 
which, consistent with his famous concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co. of Fresno, 14 the purpose of tort law is distributing the costs of the misfor­
tunes that are the inevitable consequence of modern life. Tort law is about 
establishing social norms, and the goal of tort damages is to set a price for 
violating those norms - a price that satisfies the reasonable needs of injured 
victims at minimal administrative and other expense. Traynor wants appellate 
judges to exercise greater control over pain and suffering damages, because he 
believes juries (and perhaps even trial judges) are too easily affected by the 
particular needs of the particular plaintiff. 
The problem with discussing the conflict between these "individualist" 
and "actuarial" conceptions of tort law in the context of the Seifert case is that 
we can' t  possibly know enough about the parties to provide more than a carica­
ture of their particular situations, and Traynor does not provide a justification 
for his view that the damages are too high beyond what amounts to a con­
clusory "I know it when I see it." Damages provides a much richer setting in 
which to apply the philosophical positions underlying the two Seifert opinions 
and to demonstrate that these positions are relevant, not only to the question of 
judicial control over jury awards, but also to the decisions of juries, themselves. 
The main damages question in the Sabia case is "How long will Tony 
live')" The dispute between the plaintiffs and the defense over the answer to 
this question turns out to almost precisely mirror the dispute between Traynor 
and the Seifert majority. The defense wants to treat Tony from Traynor's per­
spective: as a statistic, a "bad baby" with a predictably short lifespan deter­
mined on the basis of actuarial experience. The Sabia defense provides a better 
context than Se.ffert for understanding this actuarial perspective, however, 
because there is expert testimony (not simply Traynor's intuition) anchoring it. 
For their part, Tony's  lawyers echo the Seifert majority :  treating Tony as a 
unique individual, trapped inside an enormous cognitive, emotional, and physi­
cal disability. If Tony's  lawyers succeed, they believe (and the defense fears) 
that the jury will identify with Tony, discount the statistics, and base their dam­
ages on the lifespan that Tony's family wants him to have, rather than on what 
an actuary would predict. Again, Sabia provides a better context than Seifert 
because we come to believe that we really know Tony and his family. 
The factual depth of Damages allows students to see and understand the 
very practical differences that these theoretical positions make, and it helps 
them see the narrative power of the individualist position. I drive this final 
point home by showing the class excerpts from an understated "day in the life" 
I.J 150 P.2cl 436 (Cal. 1944). 
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video from the Sabia litigation. 15 Even students who strongly advocated the 
Traynor position immediately shift (even if momentarily) to the individualist 
perspective. This provides the perfect opportunity to discuss, if we have not 
already done so, the "problem" (from a utilitarian or efficiency perspective) of 
allowing juries to decide that everyone will live longer than expected. On a 
good day, this will lead to (or follow from) a discussion of the possible com­
pensation, deterrence, and retribution goals of tort damages, a discussion that 
will also be anchored in the factual depth of the Sabia case. My goal, which 
Damages helps me to accomplish more often than I would otherwise, is to 
connect tort theory to practice, so that even the most practically-minded stu­
dents see how tort theory explains some of the dynamics of personal mJury 
litigation. 16  
2. Breach of the Standard of Care 
Danwges helps present the "breach" element of negligence by showing 
how standard of care is developed in a medical malpractice case. As Damages 
demonstrates, standard of care is a legal concept, developed by and for courts 
for the purpose of assessing blame. Courts and their purposes operate in a very 
different social universe than doctors and hospitals, and Damages nicely illus­
trates how awkwardly the two meet. In a closed door, clubby setting, the hos­
pital peer review committee decides that Dr. Humes did nothing wrong. 17  Yet, 
Dr. Humes' lawyers can't find a doctor willing to take that position in court. 
And one of Tony's most important experts is convinced that Dr. Humes did the 
best thing she could with a bad situation. The right thing to do - the standard 
of care - is highly situational, difficult to determine, and at times subject to 
equally persuasive but mutually exclusive opinions. 
Students don't need Damages to be convinced that determining the stan­
dard of care requires a detailed understanding of facts and, therefore, that 
appellate courts should tread lightly. All torts casebooks do a good job with 
that. Where Damages improves on the casebooks is in going behind this clas­
sic appellate issue to see how a negligence case is put together at the trial level. 
How do you establish a standard of care? What kinds of evidence are relevant') 
Where do experts come from? How do lawyers work with them? How do 
experts develop their opinions? 
15 Thank you to Chris Bernard for obtaining permission from Tony's family for me to use 
the video. Although the video is helpfu l ,  it  is not necessary. I understand that facu l ty at the 
University of Missouri have received a grant to prepare teaching materials using the Sahiu 
case. Perhaps they wil l  be able to make the video available to those who want it . For 
information, please contact: James Levin. Assistant Director, or Len Riskin, Director of 
Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution. 
16 Another aspect of the S(/hia case that can raise some of the same issues is the decision by 
Tony's lawyers not to bring a case on behalf of his dead twin brother (because the relatively 
small amount of additional damages did not, in their view, justify the complications the 
claim would create on the liability side). 
1 7  For Dr. Maryellen Humes. a woman in what she perceived as a man's world, '"clubby" 
was not a comfortable thing. The role of women and other outsiders in l aw and medicine -
including the Jewish and Irish lawyers disproportionately represented in Connecticut's per­
sonal injury bar - is an intriguing theme of the book. 
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Damages shows that plaintiffs' lawyers don't first determine the standard 
of care and then examine whether the doctor breached it. They first figure out 
what the doctor did and then try to see if they can make a case that what she did 
breached a standard of care. The defense is no less disinterested. They also 
start with what the doctor did and work backward, simply toward a different 
goal. As Damages shows, no one involved in the litigation cares anything about 
standard of care in the abstract. 18 
Standing up in front of a class and telling students things like this is one 
thing. Having them see how tort law works in action is quite another. Expos­
ing students to the real world application of tort doctrine can lead them to 
critically examine what they are learning in a way that they might otherwise 
resist. For example, if the discussion starts going in a very pro-deterrence 
direction, I ask whether, based on what they have seen in Damages, they think 
tort litigation is a method of truth finding that is well suited to providing accu­
rate detenence signals to doctors and hospitals? Conversely, if deterrence 
seems a difficult and unrealistic goal, I ask why do the lawyers' appeals to 
making the clinic safer for the next patient seem so compelling? What might 
we gain from acting as if tort law deterred harm? These and other open-ended, 
impossibly vague, and hard to focus questions can be anchored to the factual 
depth of the Sabia case. Indeed, almost any student observation or comment 
can usefully be brought to ground by asking the student to tie it to the situation 
in Sabia. 
3. Causation 
Notwithstanding the title of the book, causation is the central issue in 
Sobia. Much of the action in the middle part of the book comes from Tony's 
lawyers· continuing, sometimes desperate efforts to find experts who can con­
nect the defendants' mistakes to Tony's harm. By the time we get to causation, 
the students can recite by heart the outlines of Tony's negligence claims. ll) 
Yet. as Damages dramatically demonstrates, negligence all by itself nets a 
plaintiff nothing, even assuming there is a defendant able to pay. For Tony and 
his lawyers, the multi-million dollar question is "did this supposed negligence 
couse the harm to Tony?" 
Danwges makes causation come alive on two levels. At a simple narra­
tive level, Damages shows students the importance of causation, the analytical 
and practical difference between causation and breach of the standard of care, 
1� An exception might be auto cases in which insurance adjusters and lawyers develop 
"rules of thumb" about what kinds of conduct constitute negligence. See Ross, supra note 
2. at I. These rules of thumb are "law'' only to a certain degree, so if the damages are large 
enough. lawyers and liability insurance companies may be willing to l itigate a case that 
would be clear under the rule of thumb. 
1') Dr. Humes didn ' t  know Tony's twin Michael was dead until she delivered him; she easily 
could have known he was dead moments after she walked into the delivery room; and, if she 
had known. she would have immediately delivered Tony by C-section. The Norwalk Hospi­
tal clinic did not perform repeat ultrasounds or a non-stress test on Tony during the preg­
nancy ( procedures that they now perform routinely in twin cases), and the hospital nurse in 
the delivery room inexplicably did not tell Dr. Humes the very important fact that she could 
only hear one heartbeat (healthy twins should have two heartbeats). 
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and the relationship between expert evidence and causation in fact. 20 It may be 
hard to believe. but Bany Werth makes the search for causation experts excit­
ing. and the deposition of the plaintiffs' key causation expert is one of the high 
points of the book. 
At a more sophisticated level, Damages shows the socially constructed 
nature of causation and, therefore, responsibility Y In an important sense, 
Tony's injuries had no cause until a chance meeting with another mother led 
Tony's mother to talk to a lawyer. Before that meeting, Tony's parents had no 
occasion to determine a cause: Tony's injuries existed and they had to deal 
with them. It had never occurred to them that Dr. Humes or the hospital 
"caused" Tony's condition. 
That meeting started a chain of events that created a need to establish a 
cause for Tony's injuries and that provided an enormous incentive to make Dr. 
Humes. and then Norwalk Hospital, the cause. I think it is fair to say that tort 
and insurance institutions made Dr. Humes and Norwalk Hospital the cause of 
Tony's harm. Indeed, if we imagine a world in which getting money to take 
care of Tony required proving that the injuries were an "act of God" beyond 
anyone's control, we can easily imagine the lawyers proving that. At least in 
this case, causation follows from institutional procedures and incentives.22 I 
will return to this topic in the section on insurance below. 
4. Duty and Strict LiabilitY . . 
Damages does not discuss either duty or strict liability. The defendants' 
duty to Tony is simply assumed, and strict liability is so clearly inapplicable to 
medical malpractice that the lawyers never even think about it. Yet, Damages 
helps present both of these doctrinal areas. 
With duty, the Sc1bia case provides a context for discussing the ''special 
relationship" between doctors and patients that is the source of the duty and. if 
there is time (and if the students are far enough along in contracts to make this 
20 A note of caution: the author and some of the lawyers in the case sometimes use the term 
··proximate cause"' where l think the proper term would be '"cause in fact."' When we get to 
proximate cause. this can be confusing to students. Once I clarify how we wi l l  usc the term. 
and how our usc differs from that in Damages, the confusion actually can be reassuring. 
Clearly. the lawyers in Damages are high ly competent and successful. so confusing one 
legal term for another� something beginning law students do all the time� is not the end of 
the world. I tel l  the students that, although the lawyers use of the term is not consistent with 
the way we wil l use it. their use of the term emphasizes that causation in the law is not 
always the same thing as causation in other fields. For example, a scientist might need to be 
ninety-five percent sure before concludi ng that one thing causes another. whi le a jury just 
needs to be more sure than not. Thus, an expert's v iew that the failure to do the tests did not 
··cause"' the harm to Tony would not be log ically inconsistent with a jury's conclusion that it 
did ( though it would be logically inconsistent with a contrary expert opinion). 
21 See generu llr Tom Baker. Risk. Insurance and the Social Construction of ResponsibilitY. 
in Tor"' B..xKER & JONATHJ\N SIMON, EMBRACING RisK (Tom Baker et a!. eds .. 2002) (explor­
ing the role of i nsurance in the social construction of responsibili ty). 
22 For empirical research making this point with regard to causal relationship between work 
and injury. see Richard J. Butler et a!.. HMOs, Moral Ha::.ard and Cost Shifting in Workers 
ContJJen.lution. 1 6  J. HEALTH EcoN. 1 91-206 ( 1 997) (documenting that doctors· dec ision to 
label an injury as "work-related" was affected by financial incent ives; doctors who were paid  
more if the i njury was work related were more likely to  decide that the  injury was work 
related than were doctors who were paid more if the injury was not work related). 
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a worthwhile exercise). the decision to redress breaches of that relationship 
through tort law rather than contract law. We easily could have this same dis­
cussion without reference to Damages, but by this time in the semester, the 
Sabia case has become a comfortable old friend who accompanies the class as 
we wind our way through the casebook in anything but a linear fashion. 
Damages helps more concretely with strict liability. It provides a context 
for discussing the practical differences between "truly" strict liability, products 
liability, and negligence. After we cover the strict liability materials in the 
casebook, I ask the students to apply these approaches to the Sabia case. The 
students quickly see that with truly strict liability the only liability question in 
Sabia would have been causation. It takes a bit longer, but they also see that 
with a "state of the art" products liability approach, the case against the hospital 
(but not the doctor) would have been exactly the same as it was in the book. 
The standard of care issue against the hospital in Sabia turns entirely on 
whether tests which are now routine at Norwalk Hospital should have been 
routine when Tony was born: that is essentially the same question raised by a 
state of the art defense to a products liability suit. 
Damages also provides a context for discussing whether malpractice lia­
bility should be based on negligence. Again, we could certainly have this dis­
cussion without Damages. But the book provides such a rich understanding of 
what the Sabia case meant to the people involved that it puts everyone in a 
better position to think about what it might mean to adopt strict liability, or 
some other approach, for medical injuries. 
B. Using Damages to Teach Torts Students about Insurance 
Although insurance is very important to the development of the Sabia 
case, I try not to talk about the role of insurance in the case until we get to 
causation. This does not mean ign01ing insurance in the course until then, sim­
ply using other materials. As my students can report, we discuss some aspect 
of insurance in almost every torts class, starting the first day. 
We begin the semester with an extended look at Hammontree v. Jenner?"' 
which serves as the vehicle for an overview of the course. Hammontree con­
siders and then rejects the possibility of applying some form of strict liability to 
automobile accidents. Along with introducing tort law generally, the case pro­
vides a good opportunity to begin talking about the relationship between torts 
and insurance. The opinion implicitly treats torts and insurance as very differ­
ent fields, and rejects the idea that the risk spreading possibilities of liability 
insurance should be imputed to tort law. This allows me to introduce the con­
cept of tort law as insurance that I learned from reading George Priest and 
Richard Epstein.24 For the moment, however, we confine the application of 
that idea to products liability. I am content to have students understand the 
internal risk spreading possibilities of a manufacturer (i.e. among the consum-
2·1 20 Cal . App. 3d 528 ( 1 97 1  ) .  
2 4  Richard Epstein, Producrs Liahifitr as w 1  Insurance Marker , 14 J. LEGAL Snm. 645 
( 1985); George Priest. A Theon· of rhe Consumer Producr WarranrY. 90 YALE L.J. 1297 
( 1 98 1  ). 
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ers of the product) and to distinguish between products liability and automobile 
accidents on that ground. 
Insurance comes up again in the first doctrinal unit: damages. The discus­
sion focuses again on the concept of tort Jaw as a risk spreading mechanism -
as a kind of insurance. The context now is the Seifert v. Los Angeles Transit 
Lines case discussed earlier, in which students easily see the bus company's 
liability being borne (and spread) by consumers as a part of the price of the bus 
ticket - an " insurance premium" of sorts. From this perspective, it is a small 
step to speculate that Traynor may have wanted to limit pain and suffering 
damages because he didn't  think consumers should be made to pay for large 
amounts of that kind of "insurance." 
Following up on this speculation, we discuss what kinds of insurance are 
available on the market and what relevance, if any, the insurance market should 
have to the question of what damages should be available in tort. By now 
usually at least some students are prepared to discuss this and other conse­
quences of thinking about tort law as insurance. But the Sabia case remains 
separate from this exercise. Sabia is a morality play involving real people, 
with unique identities and life stories. Some of those real people have to deal 
with insurance companies, but the Sabia case itself involves the application of 
tort law to a complex factual situation.25 
The breach and defenses units are the only parts of the course in which I 
usually stay away from insurance almost entirely.26 It 's  enough to use Dam­
ages to illustrate the conceptually backwards way in which standard of care is 
approached in litigation (i.e. ,  as discussed above, lawyers begin with what hap­
pened and then try to derive a standard of care that serves their purposes, rather 
than starting with some general standard of care). Introducing the role of insur­
ance in shaping this exercise would confuse more than enlighten at this point. 
In any event, Sabia i llustrates the underlying idea more clearly in the context of 
causation, so I wait until that unit. 
C. Insurance and Causation in the Sabia Case 
The causation dispute in Sabia nicely illustrates the shaping power of 
insurance because of the relationship between causation and the relative liabil­
ity of the doctor and the hospital. Demonstrating this requires going a bit 
deeper into the Damages story than we have so far. To those who have not yet 
read Damages, I apologize if this gives away too much of the story. 
As the lawyers in Damages explain, the standard move in a "bad baby" 
case is to prove that a botched delivery i rreparably damaged an otherwise 
healthy baby. The defense lawyers expect Tony's  lawyers to do the same in 
25 For this reason, I hold off on making the point that the amount of damages collected. and 
often the amount c la imed, is linked to the amount of insurance that i s  avai lable. This is 
prec isely the situation in Sahia . The plaintiffs· first offer of judgment is for the amount of 
the policy l imits. This is a simple enough point to make l ater and is conceptual ly d ist inct 
from the damages doctrine I am focusing on at this point in the semester. 
26 I teach immuni ties in the "'duty" section. Were I to teach immunities as defenses. i t  
would be  irresponsible to  ignore insurance. See. e.g. , Ard v .  Ard, 4 1 4  So.  2d I 0 6 6  ( Fla. 
1 982)  ( l ifting i n tra-family immuni ty only to the extent of avai lable l iab i l i ty i nsurance 
coverage). 
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Sabia for two main reasons. First, Dr. Humes never met Tony' s  mother until 
the morning of the delivery, so the case against her rests entirely on what hap­
pened that day. Second, the case for negligence in the delivery room is much 
stronger than the case for negligence earlier in the clinicY 
For these reasons, the defense lawyers assemble a causation defense that 
pushes the harm back in time, so that whatever happened in the delivery room 
did not "cause" Tony's injuries. But Tony's lawyers do not make the standard 
move. Like the defense lawyers, they also start building a case that pushes 
Tony's injuries back in time. The reason is simple: Dr. Humes only has $2 
million in insurance coverage - far less than Tony needs. Like many other 
lawyers, Tony's lawyers generally will not pursue doctors' personal assets?8 
and they don't think the j ury will hold the hospital responsible for mistakes in 
the delivery room when Dr. Humes was so clearly the "captain of the ship" that 
day. So, they don't want to focus on the delivery, either. Unlike the defense 
lawyers, however, (at least, unlike the hospital's lawyers) they want to hold the 
hospital responsible : the hospital's $ 1 7  million insurance policy is their main 
target. 
At the same time, they do not want to give up the $2 million in coverage 
from Dr. Humes. So they walk a tightrope. They need to persuade Dr. Humes ' 
insurance carrier that they can prove her mistakes caused the harm, without 
completely committing themselves to that position. Why? Because it is even 
more important to persuade Norwalk Hospital' s  insurance carrier that the 
maternity clinic's earlier mistakes caused the harm. (Of course, both could have 
contributed to the harm, but that ' s  a more complicated story than the lawyers 
want to, or in the end need to, tell. ) 
They can't walk this tightrope forever. One of the most dramatic 
moments in Damages comes shortly before the deposition of Tony's causation 
expert. As Tony' s  lawyers know, the expert is going to testify that Tony was 
injured during the weekend before the delivery - essentially letting Dr. Humes 
off the hook. But the defense lawyers all think that the expert is going to testify 
that Tony was injured during the delivery (otherwise, why would the plaintiffs 
be offering him as a witness in a case against Dr. Humes?). The combination 
of Tony' s  lawyers' secret knowledge and Dr. Humes' lawyers' fear produces a 
feverish round of negotiations. Just before the deposition, Tony's lawyers 
27 All the lawyers in the case thought that it was shocking that Dr. Humes didn't know that 
Tony ' s  twin was dead until he was delivered. Dr. Humes c laimed that it was not her faul t  
because the hospital ' s  nurses were responsible for making sure they heard two hearts beating 
when Tony's mother arrived at the hospital. Whether she is right or not, somebody clearly 
made a serious mistake. By contrast, whether the hospital ' s  maternity clinic should or 
should not have done some extra tests during the pregnancy seemed to a l l  the lawyers to 
i nvolve many more shades of gray. 
2� Werth reports: 
Koskoff proudly made a point  of not going after doctors· assets except i n  cases in which they 
were not "responsible enough" to buy adequate coverage. A certain fel l ow-feel i ng for them as 
profcssion:�ls and a d istaste for the messy busi ness of  i n O ict ing financial ru i n  on respected indi­
viduals.  panicubrly from one's own community.  precluded h is  try i ng to attach Humes· house 
and other possessions. much as Koskoff thought she deserved i t .  
WERTH, supra note l ,  at 1 58 .  For an extended analysis of plaintiffs' lawyers distaste for 
collecting real money from people. see Baker, Blood Money, supra note 3. 
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reduce their demand so that the liability insurance company has to pay less than 
the full limits of Dr. Humes' policy, and the company promptly settles.2<J Dr. 
Humes is out of the case. 
At the deposition, the expert testifies that Tony was injured well before the 
delivery. At first, the lawyer for the hospital taking the deposition is pleased, 
but she quickly realizes that this means Tony' s  lawyers have set their sights on 
her client's  insurance coverage. When the implications of this sink in, the hos­
pital invites Tony's lawyers to make a presentation to the hospital trustees, the 
real purpose of which is to educate the hospital's insurer about the potential 
exposure in the case. After receiving that education, the insurer promptly exer­
cises its rights under the insurance policy to direct the defense, sacks the hospi­
tal's defense lawyers, and hires its favorite Connecticut medical malpractice 
defense lawyer to take over the case. 30 
Insurance institutions are all over at this point. The relative size of the 
defendants' liability insurance policies determines the direction of the plain­
tiffs' causation efforts. Insurance companies, not individual or even institu­
tional defendants, control the defense and settlement of the case. 3 1  And 
because insurance companies are the real targets, Tony's parents view the 
defendants almost as abstractions, without moral connection to their claim. 
They use the Norwalk Hospital maternity clinic for their next baby and do not 
seem to blame Dr. Humes.32 
29 Although there is not time in a one semester torts case to address the significance of 
insurance Jaw's "duty to settle,' ' it is worth observing that Damages does an excel lent job 
i l lustrating the dynamics of the duty to settle and other aspects of the conflict of interest that 
is bui l t  into the l iabi l i ty i nsurance relationship .  For one entry point  in to the extensive l i tera­
ture on insurance confl icts, see El len S. Pryor & Charles S il ver, Defense Lawyers ' Profes­
sional Responsibilities: Part 1 - Excess Exposure Cases, 78 TEx. L. REv. 599 (2000). My 
foray into thi s  l i terature is Baker, Tetrahedrons. supra note 3, at 3. 
30 Surprisingly, this is one aspect of the case that Tony's very competent lawyers did not 
seem to understand. Werth reports that Tony's lawyers expected that the presentation to the 
trustees would  be the prelude to an i mmediate sett lement conference. When the only resul t  
of  the  presentation was a changing of  the  defense guard, they regarded the  presentation as a 
waste of t ime. They didn't understand enough about the dynamics on the defense side. The 
hospital ' s  l ead lawyer realized that the case needed to be settled, but he knew that because he 
had not been chosen by the i nsurance company and had never had an earlier opportun ity to 
win the confidence of the senior members of the claims department, they wou ld  never pay, 
on his recommendation, enough money to settle the case. They needed to "own'' the 
defense, and he knew that Tony 's lawyers would put on a good enough show to scare them 
into taking ownership now that Dr. Humes was out of the case. Tony ' s  lawyers' disappoint­
ment notwithstanding, the presentation accomplished a great deal . 
3 1  For example, Werth reports that when Humes final ly  wanted settlement, she couldn ' t  
make i t  happen :  
[ S ] he was sickened t o  think that she couldn · t back down now even i f  she wanted to. Her profes­
sional l i fe. her l ivelihood. were at stake. but whether they could be salvaged no longer was in her 
control. She couldn't  even sacrifice herself. She was wi l ling to do the most distasteful thing she 
could i magine. surrender for the sake of expediency to people she despised - the Koskoffs - on a 
grave charge she considered baseless. Yet even that excruciating self-betrayal was denied her. 
Again.  she was reminded that i t  was not her but her insurance pol icy that the Sabias wanted. and 
thus i t  was the owner of that policy who made the decisions. 
WERTH, supra note I ,  at 1 66. 
3 2  Werth writes: 
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Some students are outraged on behalf of Dr. Humes: "Tony 's  own expert 
testified that she wasn't responsible." "She was dragged around in the mud for 
no good reason." "They tricked her lawyers." And so on. 
On a good day, this emotion can be directed toward a real teaching 
moment. I learned how from one of Tony 's  lawyers, Chris Bernard, who vis­
ited the class midway through the first semester I used Damages . The day he 
came, two students recalled our earlier causation discussions and challenged 
him. "How could you do that to Dr. Humes?" one student asked. "It wasn ' t  
her fault," said another. That's  when the teaching moment came. Chris 
explained: 
You think M aryel len Humes wasn't responsible because that was our case, when it 
was us against the hospital. We all worked together on that - Maryel len 's  l awyers. 
us. even the hospital's lawyers. We couldn ' t  ignore the delivery, but we never had to 
look at it too hard. It was never in anyone 's interest to prove Marvel/en Humes 
caused the harm . Certainly not in her interest, and not in ours. Even the hospital had 
to stay away from it because their nurses were in the delivery room. too. B elieve me, 
if 1ve had to prove she caused the harm. we could hove. Getting shoved through the 
birth canal is a punishing process for even a healthy baby, and Tony was practically 
dead. You ' l l  never persuade me that didn't hurt Tony. S he should have done an 
emergency C-section as soon as she got in the room. Did that cause five percent of 
Tony's disability or ten percent') More') Less? Who knows? Who cares') Al l  we 
had to do is prove that she caused some of the harm. Joint and several liability takes 
care of the rest. 33 
In other words, what causes what in a tort case depends on what needs to 
cause what in order for a plaintiff to be paid, or, from a defense lawyer' s  per­
spective, for a defendant to be relieved of responsibility. For the plaintiff, what 
needs to cause what, depends on who has money.34 And that depends - often ­
on insurance. Barry Werth puts this nicely: 
With insurance c laims, size is destiny. Humes had ceased to be the Koskoffs' 
[Tony' s  law firm's] main target as soon as they realized she couldn' t afford to take 
care of Little Tony for the rest of his life. They reset their sights on Norwalk Hospi-
They made no association between the money and H umes as an individual.  In e ight years 
they had only seen her three t imes - during the birth; the day after. when she'd come to console 
Donna; and in Ryan' s  office at their deposition - and their feel i ngs about her were abstract. as i f  
H u mes were a wel l-off stranger with whose Mercedes they had col l i ded . . .  Donna bore her n o  
malice. nor d i d  she blame her for what happened to L i ttle Tony.  Though she wanted to know the 
truth. she was happy to get the money without it. "I didn't  feel l i ke we had answers." she says. 
"I fel t .  okay. now we can pay our bi l ls ." 
Tony, though they seldom talked about i t .  fel t  the same . He thought Humes was an u n fortu­
nate bystander. which made her. regrettably for her. a convenient target. He considered the suit .  
and the settlement. i n  no way personal. ' ' I 'm not resentful of Humes." he would say.  "She 
stepped i n  the middle of i t .  But. what do you do?" 
!d. at 2 1 0- 1 1 .  
33 I 'm writing this from memory, so it ' s  undoubtedly embel lished - but that's the way I use 
it now since I can't ask Chris to come back every year, and, even if I could,  I can ' t  expect 
the same magical moment each time. 
3 4  My favorite comment on this point is from a l awyer I interviewed in  Miami: "I was 
taught on my first day of practice there are three things: liability, damages, col l ectibility. I 
need collectibility first. I need damages second. I ' m  a good lawyer, I ' l l  prove liability." 
Taken from Tom B aker, Transforming Punishment Into Compensation, I 998 Wis.  L. REv. 
2 1 1 .  222 ( 1 998) .  
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tal, which could afford it. If she had caiTied more insurance. Humes would have 
been more attractive as a defendant and the Koskoffs would have had more i ncentive 
to keep her in the case. She· d also have had more clout as an insured. St .  Paul [her 
i nsurance company] ,  with more to lose, might have been compelled to defend her 
more vigorously .  Now i t  was the i nadequacy of her coverage that decided her fate.35 
The jurisprudential point is the same one touched on earlier : causation 
and responsibility are created, not revealed. We are used to observing that 
judges create legal rules,36 and that proximate cause is a legal invention.37 
Observing that causation in fact can also be a creation of the legal process 
takes students a step further in understanding the role of law in the social con­
struction of reality . 
Even if we can imagine that there is some '·real" or ' 'essential" cause for 
an injury (or anything else for that matter), we can never even hope to see it 
except through the perspectives our history and institutions offer us. Whether 
students grasp this larger philosophical point or not does not matter.3 8  It is 
enough to see the relationship between insurance and causation in the Sabia 
case and to realize that similar dynamics are at work in other aspects of law. 
At the end of the causation discussion, we turn the insurance lens on other 
aspects of the Sabia case. I tell the students that I have been avoiding making 
the connection between insurance and Sabia and ask them to prepare for the 
next class by identifying all the other ways insurance affects Tony's case. For 
many students, this exercise is a revelation. It is not as dramatic as the famous 
drawings in which changing perspective reveals an entirely different subject. 
But, rereading Damages with insurance firmly in mind gives students a new 
perspective that supplements their growing confidence with doctrine and legal 
reasoning. All the students bring back specific examples of the control that 
liability insurance exercises over tort practice.39 Some students are even able 
to identify the more subtle role of first party insurance.40 Mission 
accomplished. 
·15 WERTH, supra note I ,  at 205-06. 
36 See, e.g. , Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ .  of Cal . ,  55 1 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal .  1 976) ("legal 
duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in  cases 
of a particular type, l iabi l i ty should be imposed for damage done" ) .  
3 7  See Pal sgraff v .  Long Island R.R.  Co . ,  1 62 N . E .  99 (N.Y.  1 928). 
38 For an i l luminating exposition of perspect ivism, see ALEXANDER NEHAMAS, NIETZSCHE: 
LIFE AS LITERATURE ( 1 987). Cf RoBERTO Ur-<GER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLITics 3 1 -36 ( 1 975) 
( on the antinomy between fact and theory). 
39 For example: In  practice, l iab i l i ty i nsurance i s  an e lement of tort l iabil i ty, at least for 
ordinary individual or small business defendants. Liabi l i ty insurance policy l imits are de 
facto caps on tort damages. Tort claims are shaped to match the avai lable l iabi l i ty i nsurance 
coverage. Liab i l i ty insurance companies control the defense and settlement of tort c la ims 
with an eye toward the long term interests of the insurance company, which are not always 
the same as those of the defendant. At  l east with respect to the settlement of a c la im, the 
defendant and the plaintiff often come to s hare common in terests, and work together to get 
the insurance company to pay, so that the dispute becomes one between the insurance com­
pany and the l i tigants on both s ides of the tort case. 
40 Tony ' s  parents need the lawsuit  because they don ' t  have enough first party insurance. 
The coinsurance on their health insurance i s  a "black hole" in  the household budget and 
there are expenses l ike home care that are not covered by insurance at a l l .  At the same time, 
the presence of this ,  admittedly inadequate, first party insurance means that Tony ' s  parents 
can be made nearly as whole as money can make them by a settlement that gi ves them 
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I II. CoNCLUSION: THE BROADER CASE FOR Us iNG DAMAGES 
40 1 
Clearly. this discussion does not begin to exhaust the ways to use Dam­
ages in a torts class. Other torts teachers would no doubt use the book in other. 
more effective ways. My goal here has been to convey a sense of what is 
possible. 
In concluding, I would like to emphasize one benefit of using Damages 
that transcends torts or insurance: the opportunity to work over the course of 
many weeks with a complicated factual situation. Law schools are very good at 
teaching students to begin to think in remarkably sophisticated ways about 
rules and standards, common law reasoning, and various theoretical approaches 
to law and policy. Outside of clinics and some simulation classes, however, law 
schools do very little to teach students to think critically about facts - what they 
are. how they are developed, how lawyers work with them. 
Many casebooks demonstrate (some intentionally, others not) what critical 
legal studies scholars have called the indeterminacy thesis: legal rules and 
standards as well as their application are indeterminate (always at the margins 
and sometimes elsewhere) . ..� '  But the indeterminacy casebooks typically 
demonstrate is the indeterminacy of "law" not "facts" (recognizing that there is 
no clear ground between these two). The indeterminacy the law in action dem­
onstrates is far more profound, because it extends to facts. Studying law in 
action reveals the insubstantial. made-up nature of many of the supposedly 
solid. hard facts the appellate case method usually takes for granted. 
That students intuitively grasp at least some degree of factual indetermi­
nacy is demonstrated by how often they attempt to "argue the facts" during the 
discussion of an appellate opinion, especially in first year courses. As they 
know from their own Jives. if people are willing to disagree publicly about a 
situation, the facts of that situation are almost never clear cut. "Even the thin­
nest pancake has two sides," as one trial lawyer put it. 
By the end of the first semester we usually have trained the tendency to 
argue the facts ou< of our students. This training improves their ability to work 
with legal doctrine, but it comes at a cost. The cost is the lost opportunity to 
teach them how to train their emerging critical facilities on the facts of a case as 
well as the law. 
The result is that even good students too often are left with one of two 
nMve approaches to facts - approaches that mirror mistakes we are accustomed 
to addressing directly when it comes to legal rules. Either they persist in think­
ing that legal disputes can always be resolved on the basis of solid, knowable 
facts - much as some students persist in thinking that disputes always can be 
resolved through the application of determinable rules. Or, they flip to the 
nothing for pain and suffering less than al l  Tony ' s  medical costs and lost  wages. Why') 
Because they get to count as damages all the costs of Tony's care, even though a very large 
part of the past expenses were covered by insurance (and most l ikely a l arge part of the 
future expenses wi l l  be as wel l )  . 
.J I  My purpose here i s  not to take a strong stand on indeterminacy. Cf. Steven Winter, 
IndeterminacY and Incommensurability in Constitutional Lmr, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1 44 1  ( 1 990). 
My basic point works equally wel l  for people who prefer to think that l egal rules and stan­
dards are '"underdetermined.' " See, e.g. , Lawrence Solum. On the Indeterminacy Crisis: 
Criti1111ing Critical Dogma , 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 462 ( 1 987) .  
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(even more mistaken) view that anything goes, that " 'lawyers are liars." and that 
the legal process has nothing to do with truth - much as some students tlip to 
the view that, because law is really all about power, legal rules and standards 
never determine anything. 
Many, if not most lawyers in practice spend far more time understanding 
and developing facts than they do developing or researching legal theories. 
Litigators develop facts retrospectively. Transactional lawyers develop facts 
prospectively. With the exception of appellate and a few other kinds of special­
ists, this focus on facts increases with the number of years in practice . As a 
result, the working lawyer's  craft has more in common with that of the modern 
historian (in the case of a litigator) or business analyst (in the case of a transac­
tional lawyer) than that of the judges whose opinions we spend so much time 
teaching. In practice, lawyers are connoisseurs of facts, even more than law. 
We owe it to our students to prepare them for this situation. Using Damages in 
the law school classroom takes a small, but important step in that direction. 
